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IN MEMORIAL 
 
On November 13, 2006 50-
year-old Ontario Provincial 
Police (OPP) Constable David 
Mounsey died in hospital as a 
result of injuries he sustained 
in an on-duty collision on 
October 14th, 2006. Constable Mounsey was a 
dedicated officer who was 
well liked and respected by 
his peers and members of 
the community. He began his 
career with the Royal Air 
Force in Britain, before 
joining the OPP and being 
posted to the Haldimand-
Norfolk OPP Detachment. He then later 
accepted his present posting at the Huron 
County Detachment. He 
served eight years with the 
OPP and showed his pride as a 
committed member of the 
West Region Ceremonial Unit. 
He was also a volunteer 
firefighter with the Blyth 
and District Fire Department. 
He is survived by his wife and 
3 children. 
 
“They are our heroes, 
We shall not forget them”1 
 
The preceding information was provided with the 
permission of the Officer Down Memorial Page: 
available at www.odmp.org/Canada 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Inscription on Canadian Police and Peace Officer Memorial—Parliament Buildings 
 
DETENTION BASED ON 
REASONABLE SUSPICION 
LAWFUL 
R. v. Beladjat, 2006 QCCA 588 
 
A citizen called police after 
seeing two black men leave a 
vehicle while the driver remained 
inside. The men were dressed in 
black, one wearing a ski mask and 
the other a cap. They went towards a house and 
retuned a few minutes later, leaving in the 
vehicle. A few minutes later the police 
intercepted a vehicle traveling in the reported 
direction about 500 m from incident. It was 
occupied by three men; two black and one white 
(the accused). The accused was wearing a black 
coat and false collar and was recognized as a 
member of a street gang. He was searched for 
safety reasons and police found a telescopic 
baton in his coat pocket. He was subsequently 
convicted of possessing a prohibited weapon.  
 
The accused appealed his conviction to the 
Quebec Court of Appeal submitting his arrest 
and search were unlawful. The Court of Appeal 
disagreed and upheld the accused’s conviction. 
The police had reasonable grounds to suspect he 
was implicated in a crime which justified the 
stopping of the vehicle and detention of the 
three men for investigation for a short period. 
The search, for safety purposes, was also lawful.   
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
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 ‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
“I had one of your 
publications forwarded to me 
and found it educational and 
very easy to read (nice when 
your brain is mush after 12 
hours on shift!)”—RCMP Constable, British 
Columbia 
************ 
“I have been reading [the 10-8 Newsletter] for a 
while now and find it very interesting and 
useful”—RCMP Constable, British Columbia 
************ 
“Enjoy reading each article. Fabulous 
newsletter”—Police Academy Instructor, Prince 
Edward Island 
************ 
”I find the biggest challenge trying to keep up on 
case law, as I think that is an essential part of 
the job. Figured…10-8 is an awesome resource 
for the contents of the case law and then could 
read the entire case if applicable”—Detective 
Constable, British Columbia  
************ 
“We have recently started reading [10-8] at 
work, and since we deal with so many impaired 
driving and warrant files, we find the case 
reviews very helpful! Thanks a lot!”—Canada 
Border Services Officer, British Columbia 
************ 
“Our recruits are made aware of your newsletter 
and often ask me questions about the cases you 
have highlighted in class. Kind of wets their 
appetites with respect to becoming criminal 
investigators.”—Police Academy Instructor, 
Alberta 
************ 
“Could I trouble you to place me on your 
electronic distribution list?  It is a great 
resource that I have often used for discussions 
in our briefings.  Normally I just locate one 
printed out in our office but it's time that I 
subscribe myself!   Thanks.”—RCMP Corporal, 
British Columbia  
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‘IN SERVICE’ LEGAL ROAD      
TEST 
 
The “In Service” 
Legal Road Test is a 
simple multiple choice 
quiz designed to 
challenge your understanding of the law. Each 
question is based on a case featured in this 
issue. See page 22 for the answers. 
 
1.  A conclusory statement of electrical theft by 
a Hydro employee may be sufficient to justify 
a warrant to search for an electrical bypass. 
(a) True 
(b) False 
 
2. A police officer who bends over and sniffs a 
bag on a luggage trolley at a bus depot does 
not ‘search’ the bag as defined in s.8 Charter 
jurisprudence. 
 (a) True 
 (b) False 
 
3. A Hydro employee’s observations after 
entering onto property to check electrical 
usage for Hydro purposes cannot be used by 
police to support a search warrant because 
the employee acts as an agent of the state 
when they go onto the property to check the 
meter. 
(a) True 
(b) False 
 
4. A statutorily compelled statement from the 
driver of a motor vehicle by police while 
investigating a traffic accident can be used 
by police in an impaired driving/over 80mg% 
trial?  
(a) True 
(b) False 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
When faced with a challenge, look for a way, not 
a way out—David L. Weatherford 
 
BULLET POINTS 
 
BC’s Top Municipal Crime Rates (2005) 
Municipality Crime Rate2 
Smithers 301 
Williams Lake 252 
Quesnel 237 
Fort St. John 228 
Merritt 228 
Dawson Creek 225 
Port Alberni 210 
Terrace 206 
Prince Rupert 204 
Squamish 204 
Whistler 202 
Source: Municipal Crime Rate Report, Police Services Division, Ministry of 
Public Safety and Solicitor General—July 2006 www.pssg.gov. 
bc.ca/police_services/publications/crime_rates_burdens/MunCrimeRate_ 
2001-2005.pdf 
 
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE 
DESPITE UNLAWFUL 
DETENTION 
R. v. Calder, 2006 ABCA 307 
 
A police officer patrolling a 
summer festival event attended 
by several hundred people saw 
the accused hand money to 
another man and return his cupped hand to his 
pocket. The officer suspected a drug deal and, 
along with his partner, approached the men. The 
accused was told he was under investigative 
detention for trafficking and was patted down 
for weapons. In his pocket the officer felt a 
long, hard object which turned out to be a knife. 
He continued the pat-down and felt a bulge in 
the accused’s right pant pocket. He searched 
inside the pocket and removed two spitballs of 
cocaine. The accused was arrested and a further 
search located a loaded, sawed off 22 calibre 
rifle in his backpack, additional cocaine, bear 
spray, empty baggies, and a digital scale. The 
                                                 
2 Criminal Code offences per 1,000 Population 
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accused was charged with possession for the 
purpose of trafficking and several weapons 
offences.  
 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the judge 
found the officer did not have reasonable 
grounds to detain the accused and the search 
that followed was unreasonable. Furthermore, 
given the size of the spit balls the officer could 
not have believed in good faith that the bulge in 
the pants was a weapon. The seizure of the 
drugs, rifle, and other items was therefore 
unlawful. However, under s.24(2) the trial judge 
admitted the evidence. The search was non-
conscriptive, unobtrusive, and no force was used. 
Moreover, having a loaded rifle in a public area 
favoured admission. The evidence was ruled 
admissible and the accused was convicted.  
 
He then appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
arguing the trial judge erred in excluding the 
evidence. In his view, the trial judge did not give 
proper consideration to her finding the police 
lacked good faith in conducting the search and 
also erred in holding that the public’s outrage 
against crime, particularly gun crime, mitigated 
that bad faith. 
 
In a 2:1 decision, the Alberta Court of Appeal 
upheld the admission of the evidence. Although 
the trial judge found serious misconduct on the 
part of the police, she properly considered the 
three-step inquiry required for the admissibility 
of evidence:  
 
1) trial fairness; 
2) seriousness of police conduct; and  
3) the effects of excluding the evidence on the 
administration of justice.   
 
First, the evidence was non-conscriptive and 
admission would not affect trial fairness. As for 
the second step, assessing the seriousness of 
police conduct, the majority stated:   
 
The trial judge…found that [the officer] did 
not have reasonable grounds to suspect the 
[accused] had been involved in a drug 
transaction. Further, the search that led to 
the arrest of the [accused] was a pat-down 
search incidental to an investigative detention. 
Such a search is lawful only if the officer 
believes on reasonable grounds that his or her 
own safety, or the safety of others, is at risk. 
The trial judge found that [the officer] could 
not have had such reasonable grounds to 
search the [accused’s] pant pocket. That 
finding was reasonable, having regard to the 
evidence of the size of the items discovered in 
that pocket. The lack of reasonable grounds 
led the trial judge to conclude the search was 
not committed in good faith, a finding that 
indicates a relatively serious breach of the 
[accused’s] rights. Balanced against this 
finding is the trial judge’s conclusion that the 
search was not obtrusive.  
 
Finally, admission of the evidence would not bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute. The 
drugs and rifle were essential to the Crown’s 
case. The offences were serious and aggravated 
by the circumstances; possession of a loaded 
firearm in a very public place during an event 
attended by hundreds of people. “Public concerns 
regarding the increasing threat to public safety 
which arises from the use and possession of 
firearms in the commission of offences is a 
factor which must be given serious consideration 
and in appropriate circumstances such as found 
here can override a finding of police 
misconduct,” said the majority. “Our conclusion 
would have been different if there had been no 
loaded weapon, or if the circumstances had not 
involved such an evident and immediate threat to 
public safety.” 
 
Justice Berger, the lone dissent of the court, 
came to a different conclusion. He first noted 
that the trial judge found the police arbitrarily 
detained the accused. The trial judge concluded 
the officer did not have reasonable grounds to 
suspect the accused was involved in a drug 
transaction and that the officer could not have 
subjectively believed the pocket bulge was a 
weapon because of its size. As a result, the 
officer did not have reasonable grounds to 
believe his safety or that of others was at risk 
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and the search and seizure that resulted was 
unlawful and unreasonable.  
 
In Justice Berger’s view the Charter breaches 
were “wilful and flagrant. The police significantly 
overstepped the bounds of proper police 
conduct” and acted in bad faith. Furthermore, 
the officer’s testimony was “unworthy of belief.” 
Although the reliable evidence seized in this 
case was essential to the Crown’s case for a 
serious criminal charge, the admission of the 
evidence would “exact too heavy a toll on the 
long term integrity of the administration of 
justice.” Justice Berger would have excluded the 
impugned evidence, overturned the convictions,  
and entered acquittals on all charges.  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
DRIVEWAY INVESTIGATION 
DOES NOT EXCEED LIMITS OF 
IMPLIED INVITATION 
R. v. Lotozky,  
(2006) Docket:C43322 (OntCA) 
 
At about 1:00 am two police 
officers responded to a 
suspected impaired driver call. 
It was reported that the driver 
of a vehicle at a fast food drive through window 
was too intoxicated to order. A general vehicle 
description was provided along with a license 
plate number. The licence plate was queried by 
computer and the officers attended the 
registered owner’s address. The officers parked 
in front of the address and a car turned on to 
the street. The car was being driven very slowly 
and stopped on the street, flashing its high 
beams. The car moved again, stopped a second 
time, and then made a slow turn into the 
driveway of the registered owner’s address. 
After the vehicle stopped the officer’s 
approached the driver’s window. 
 
The officers watched the accused fumble with a 
fast food bag. One officer knocked on the 
window and the accused got out of the car and 
leaned against the door. The officer asked to 
see his licence, ownership documents and 
insurance. He fumbled with the documents and 
had to be asked again to provide them. He had 
difficulty maintaining his balance, his eyes were 
watery, he looked disheveled, and there was a 
smell of alcohol on his breath. When asked how 
much he had to drink he said one beer. An 
officer formed the opinion the accused’s ability 
to drive was impaired by alcohol, he was 
arrested, and his vehicle towed. He subsequently 
provided two samples over the legal limit.  
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
judge found the police had violated the accused’s 
rights under s.8 of the Charter because they 
entered onto the driveway to investigate a 
criminal offence. Under these circumstances the 
police were not entitled to walk up the driveway 
attached to a dwelling house to investigate the 
suspected impaired driving. The fruits of the 
investigation, the breath samples, were 
inadmissible and charges of impaired driving and 
over 80mg% were dismissed.  
 
The Crown unsuccessfully appealed to the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The superior 
court judge found the accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy on his driveway. Further, 
the police exceeded the bounds of the implied 
licence doctrine when they entered to 
investigate a suspected criminal offence. By 
entering onto the driveway, the police were 
conducting a warrantless search which was prima 
facie unreasonable. Since the Crown did not 
rebut the presumption, the search was 
unreasonable and the Crown’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
The Crown then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the accused did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
driveway and s.8 of the Charter was therefore 
not triggered. Further, even if there was a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
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driveway, entrance onto it was lawful, in part, 
under the implied licence doctrine.  
 
Justice Rosenberg divided the police conduct 
into four separate elements: 
 
1) walking onto the driveway; 
2) tapping on the window to get the 
accused’s attention; 
3) questioning the accused about his 
licence, ownership, and insurance; and 
4) making the breathalyzer demand. 
 
Unlike the fourth element which was clearly a 
search and seizure the first three were not.  
Justice Rosenberg stated: 
 
…despite the breadth of the notion of search 
and seizure, merely walking on to a driveway, 
even with an intent to conduct an investigation 
involving the owner, does not, in my view, 
constitute a sufficient intrusion to be 
considered a search.  There must be something 
more, as in the perimeter search cases, 
peering in windows of the home and trying to 
detect odours from within.  Put another way, 
not every trespass on to private property by 
police can constitute a search.  I would not 
place a possible trespass on to a driveway open 
to public view in the category of a search or 
seizure.  
 
As regards the other two aspects of the police 
conduct, I tend to think that merely tapping on 
the window, like peering into a window with a 
flashlight, does not involve a search.  Asking 
routine questions of a motorist about licence, 
ownership and insurance similarly would not 
seem to be the type of questioning that would 
lead to a finding of a sufficient intrusion into a 
reasonable expectation of privacy… Finally, 
cases concerning questioning of motorists in 
drinking and driving situations have turned on 
issues such as right to counsel and detention; 
not search and seizure… Obviously, the fact 
that the courts have not dealt with this 
element of the drinking and driving paradigm 
as a search issue is not determinative, but it 
does suggest to me that in most cases the 
search and seizure threshold is not crossed 
until the breathalyser demand is 
made…[references omitted, paras. 18-19] 
 
However, even though walking onto the driveway, 
tapping on the window and asking for documents 
was not a search, the breath demand was. Hence, 
if the police were trespassers when they made 
the demand the police conduct was unlawful. 
 
In this case, Justice Rosenberg examined the 
police conduct under the implied licence 
doctrine. This common law doctrine recognizes 
that an occupier of a dwelling gives implied 
licence to any member of the public on legitimate 
business, including the police, to enter onto the 
property. This invitation waives the privacy 
interest that an occupant may otherwise have in 
the approach to the door of their home provided 
the police enter onto the property for the 
specific purpose of communicating with the 
occupant. If the police, however, enter onto the 
property to secure evidence against the 
occupant by engaging in a search they have 
exceeded the boundaries of implied licence. If 
the occupant tells the police to leave, the licence 
is withdrawn and the police must leave unless 
they have acquired reasonable grounds to make 
an arrest before that time. Justice Rosenberg 
noted that this case was different than other 
cases involving police knocking on a door: 
 
In my view, there is a fundamental difference 
between the police conduct of knocking on the 
door of a dwelling house to investigate the 
occupants…and merely entering on to a 
driveway.  The latter does not involve an 
investigation of persons in their own home.  A 
driveway is not a dwelling house; it is a place 
where people drive and park their vehicles.  It 
is an open area that is visible to the public.  
The scope of the implied invitation must be 
analyzed in that context. [para. 32] 
 
Justice Rosenberg continued: 
 
The fact that the police officer intends to 
pursue an investigation on the driveway, at 
least if the investigation relates to a motor 
vehicle, does not in my view exceed the bounds 
of the implied invitation, provided that the 
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officer has a legitimate basis for entering on 
the driveway.  Interpreting the common law in 
this way is, in my view, consistent with the 
broader principle…that licences may arise by 
implication from the nature of the use to 
which the owner puts the property.  As I have 
said, the use to which this property is put is to 
park motor vehicles and it is an area of the 
property that is open to public view. 
 
The officers in this case had a legitimate basis 
for entering on the driveway.  They had 
received a report that the driver of the car 
associated with the address was apparently 
impaired.  The driver drove the vehicle in an 
unusual fashion as he approached the 
driveway.  The officers would have been 
entitled to stop the vehicle on the street 
under s. 48(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.  
For reasons of safety, they waited until the 
motorist had brought the vehicle safely to a 
stop.  This was a reasonable decision to make.  
It makes no sense that because the officers 
exercised a reasonable degree of caution their 
actions should be characterized as illegitimate. 
 
There are other reasons for viewing the 
officers’ actions as legitimately within the 
scope of the implied licence.  It would not be 
good policy to interpret the law as encouraging 
motorists to avoid the reach of legitimate 
traffic investigations by heading for home and 
thus encouraging a high-speed police chase.  
Further, until the impaired driving complaint 
was investigated there was a risk that an 
impaired driver would re-enter the vehicle and 
drive while impaired.  It is not reasonable to 
expect the police to devote resources to 
waiting outside the motorist’s house until he or 
she returns to the street. [references 
omitted, paras. 35-37] 
 
Thus, the police were lawfully on the driveway in 
accordance with an implied invitation. The police 
were not asked to leave the property before 
reasonable grounds for arrest and the breath 
demand were formed. There was no s.8 breach. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittal set aside, and a new trial was ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
BC’s RCMP/Independent Municipal Forces 
population > 15,000  
Cost per Capita (2005) 
Police Department/Detachment Cost per 
Capita ($) 
Victoria 329 
Vancouver 291 
New Westminster 276 
Port Alberni (RCMP) 249 
Langley City (RCMP) 237 
West Vancouver  222 
Fort St John (RCMP) 213 
Delta 205 
Port Moody 203 
Prince George (RCMP) 201 
Abbotsford 199 
Oak Bay 194 
North Vancouver City (RCMP) 186 
Mission (RCMP) 183 
Nanaimo (RCMP) 183 
Kamloops (RCMP) 181 
Central Saanich  181 
Saanich 176 
Campbell River (RCMP) 173 
Langley Township (RCMP) 168 
Surrey (RCMP) 167 
Vernon (RCMP) 165 
Burnaby (RCMP) 160 
White Rock (RCMP) 160 
Cranbrook (RCMP) 159 
Langford (RCMP) 156 
Chilliwack (RCMP) 154 
Penticton (RCMP) 154 
Maple Ridge (RCMP)  152 
Richmond (RCMP) 152 
Kelowna (RCMP) 149 
Courtenay (RCMP) 147 
Coquitlam (RCMP) 139 
North Vancouver District (RCMP) 133 
Port Coquitlam (RCMP) 133 
North Cowichan (RCMP) 127 
Salmon Arm (RCMP) 104 
Source: Police Services, Ministry of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General, August 2006 available at 
www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/police_services/publications/other/MU
NSUM2005.pdf [accessed, September 18, 2006] 
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CONCLUSORY STATEMENT BY 
HYDRO SUFFICIENT FOR 
REASONABLE GROUNDS 
R. v. Le & Nguyen, R. v. Tran,  
2006 BCCA 298 
 
A police officer swore an 
information to obtain a search 
warrant for the purpose of 
investigating the theft of 
electricity under s.326(1)(a) of the Criminal 
Code. The grounds, in part, included information 
received by facsimile from a BC Hydro employee. 
Along with the employees’ qualifications, the 
information stated that there was a pre-meter 
theft of electricity occurring at the residence 
based upon the measured electrical consumption 
going to the property compared with the timed 
meter consumption. A search warrant was issued 
allowing police to search for an electrical bypass 
and documents related to residency. The warrant 
was executed and the accused were charged 
with production, possession for the purpose of 
trafficking, and theft of electricity.  
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused argued their rights under s.8 of the 
Charter had been violated and the evidence 
should have been excluded under s.24(2). The 
judge agreed, holding that the information to 
obtain was insufficient and the grounds were 
lacking. The information provided by BC Hydro 
merely stated a conclusion without any basis or 
factual foundation for reaching the conclusion. 
As a result, the statements from BC Hydro were 
not sufficient to provide reasonable grounds for 
the warrant, the evidence was excluded, and the 
accused were acquitted.  
 
The Crown appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in 
ruling the BC Hydro reports could not provide 
reasonable grounds for the warrant. The 
standard for issuing a warrant is whether the 
information to obtain contains sufficient 
information to give rise to reasonable grounds 
for believing that a crime has been committed. 
Justice Kirkpatrick, authoring the opinion of the 
Court, described reasonable grounds as follows: 
 
The standard is “reasonable probability”, not 
“proof beyond a reasonable doubt” or “prima 
facie case”…A belief will be founded on 
reasonable grounds “where there is an 
objective basis for the belief which is based 
on compelling and credible information”… 
[references omitted, para. 15] 
 
In this case, the information received from BC 
Hydro that its qualified employees had compared 
the electricity going to the house with the meter 
would be enough to support the warrant. The 
information before the justice issuing the 
warrant was from persons with specialized skill 
and training employed by the entity complaining 
about the theft of its services. The source of 
the information was reliable and there was no 
complexity about the calculation of the 
measurements. Justice Kirkpatrick stated: 
 
The authorizing judicial officer had before 
her information that demonstrated that on 
two occasions qualified B.C. Hydro technicians 
trained in detecting the theft of the 
company's property attended at the dwelling 
house.  [One] measured the total electricity 
going to the dwelling.  [The other] measured 
the amount of electricity recorded by the 
dwelling's meter.  The measurements disclosed 
that more electricity was being used than was 
being recorded by the meter for billing 
purposes.  Based on that discrepancy, [the 
technicians] stated that they believed that 
pre-metered theft was taking place. [para. 21] 
 
And further: 
 
In each of the cases at bar, the authorizing 
judicial officer had a report from the alleged 
victim of a crime that, by the check of its own 
equipment, had determined that its property 
was being stolen.  Based on such information 
from a credible source, the authorizing judicial 
officer could have been satisfied that there 
was an objective basis to believe that a crime 
was probably being committed.  Although I 
think that the use of the word "theft" in the 
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Information to Obtain was unnecessary and 
suggests a legal conclusion, it is clear from all 
of the circumstances that, based on the 
measurements conducted, there were more 
than sufficient reasonable grounds to believe a 
"suspected theft" was occurring. [para. 23] 
 
The Court concluded that the BC Hydro reports 
were sufficient to support reasonable grounds 
to believe that a crime had occurred. The 
warrant was validly authorized and the appeal 
was allowed, the acquittals set aside, and new 
trials were ordered.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
COP SNIFF NOT A SEARCH 
R. v. Rajaratnam, 2006 ABCA 333 
 
Two plain clothed officers who 
were part of a Jetway Unit 
were watching passengers 
disembark from a bus at a 
Calgary Greyhound depot. The 
Jetway Unit targets criminal activity by looking 
for suspicious behaviour. As the accused 
disembarked from a bus, he and an officer 
“locked eyes.” The accused walked over to a bag, 
unlocked it, looked through it, closed it, and then 
locked it. The bag was left beside the bus with 
other luggage and the accused continued into the 
terminal. The officer went over to the bag and 
noted it was tagged for Montreal.  
 
He then located the accused seated on the curb 
outside the terminal, showed him  his badge and 
said, “I’m a police officer out here at the bus 
depot. You’re not in any sort of trouble and 
you’re free to go at any time. We just talk to 
people as they are traveling.” The officer began 
to speak with the accused, requesting to see his 
ticket and identification, enquiring into his travel 
plans, and asking whether he was carry drugs or 
large quantities of money. As a result of their 
interaction with the accused the police noted 
the following: 
 
• he purchased his ticket in a false name 
with cash at the last minute; 
• he could not provide a credible 
explanation regarding the timing and 
duration of his trip. He said he was going 
to Montreal to visit his brother even 
though his ticket was valid for seven 
days, with six of those days involving 
travel; 
• he became nervous when the police noted 
his identification and the name on his 
ticket did not match; 
 
Another officer located the accused’s bag, which 
was tagged with a false name and had been 
loaded onto a trolley. He bent over and sniffed it 
at the seam and zipper, noting a strong odour of 
Bounce fabric softener. In the officer’s training 
and experience, fabric softner sheets, like 
coffee and bleach, are used as camouflage 
agents to mask the odour of drugs. The accused 
was then arrested for possession and trafficking 
in drugs. A key for the bag was located in the 
accused’s carry-on bag, the bag unlocked, and 
two bricks of cocaine and four sheets of bounce 
where found in the bag.  
 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
the accused was convicted of possessing cocaine 
for the purpose of trafficking. The trial judge 
concluded that he had not been detained or 
subject to a search prior to his arrest and the 
when the police did arrest him they had 
reasonable grounds to do so. The search of his 
bag was incidental to arrest and there were no 
Charter breaches to the accused’s rights. The 
accused then appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing he was detained when the police 
began to talk with him, that they did not have 
reasonable grounds to arrest him, and that 
sniffing his baggage was a search protected 
under s.8 of the Charter.  
 
The Detention 
 
The Alberta Court of Appeal ruled that the trial 
judge did not err in concluding the accused was 
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not detained within the meaning of the Charter. 
The accused was clearly not physically detained 
nor was he psychologically detained in the sense 
that he did not have a reasonable perception 
that his freedom of choice was suspended. The 
Court stated: 
 
[N]ot every conversation with the police is a 
detention. There must be something more: a 
deprivation of liberty. The law has not yet 
reached a point that a compulsion to comply 
will be inferred whenever a police officer 
requests information, for that would mean 
police could never ask questions. [para. 13] 
 
Deciding whether someone is detained or not 
involves a highly fact-dependent analysis and 
involves an examination of the totality of the 
circumstances including: 
 
• the language used by police; 
• the stage of investigation; 
• whether the police had reasonable 
grounds an offence was being committed 
at the time of the conversation; 
• the nature of the questioning; 
• the person’s subjective belief as to 
whether they felt detained; and 
• the person’s personal experiences that 
might affect their perceptions of the 
questioning. 
 
In this case, although the police were suspicious 
of the accused they did not have grounds to 
believe he was committing an offence. He was 
told he was not in any trouble and free to go at 
any time. The conversation was polite, friendly, 
and voluntary. 
 
The “Sniff” 
 
Section 8 of the Charter protects a person 
against police investigative techniques only if 
those techniques intrude upon a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Although the 
accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the bag itself, he did not have a 
constitutionally protected interest in the air 
space around the bag. The Court wrote: 
…Arguably, there may be some nexus between 
the sniff and the contents, because a sniff 
may provide information about what is inside a 
bag. In the same way, visual observation of a 
soft bag that conforms to the shape of an 
interior object, such as a sharp pointed item, 
may provide information about the contents of 
a bag. But neither a visual nor an olfactory 
human observation can be equated 
categorically to a search of the contents in 
these circumstances. [para. 37] 
 
And further: 
 
The place where the alleged search took place 
is an important factor in this case. The bag 
was in an area where the traveling public (but 
not the general public) and Greyhound 
employees were permitted, although [the 
accused] was not aware that the general public 
would not have access. It was not in a locker, 
or being carried on [the accused’s] person. It 
was checked baggage, first handled by 
Greyhound employees, then stored with other 
bags in the underbelly of a bus, then removed 
by other Greyhound employees and left out in 
the open, in the midst of luggage that would be 
handled by other passengers. The trial judge 
made a critical finding that odour emanating 
from the bag could have been detected by 
third parties, such as baggage handlers and 
fellow passengers, and was not subject to an 
obligation of confidentiality…  
 
 [The accused] attacks this finding, claiming 
that the sniff is a search of the contents of 
the bag, the privacy interest attaches to the 
contents and police cannot search the contents 
of luggage unless they have a warrant based on 
reasonable grounds. 
 
This argument ignores the fact that the odour 
of the Bounce sheets escaped into the public 
air space, something a reasonable person would 
realize. In fact, the very reason the Bounce 
sheets were placed in the bag was to allow the 
pungent odour to escape and mask the smell of 
drugs. While the officers confirmed the 
presence of Bounce sheets by sniffing quite 
close to the bag, a reasonable person in these 
circumstances would foresee that others, 
including baggage handlers and fellow 
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passengers, would come close enough to the 
bag to detect the odour. [paras. 42-44] 
 
The search was not intrusive nor did it expose 
any intimate details of the accused’s lifestyle, 
offer insight into his private life, affect his 
dignity, integrity, or autonomy, or provide 
information of a biographical nature: 
 
The final consideration is whether the sniff 
exposed any intimate details about [the 
accused’s] private life, or information of a 
biographical nature, or affected his dignity, 
integrity and autonomy. The smell of Bounce 
did not provide any biographical information. 
It mayhave permitted inferences about [the 
accused’s] lifestyle, in the sense that he was a 
drug courier, but only when considered in light 
of the officers’ other observations and their 
training in detecting camouflage agents. 
 
Of course, a sniff could reveal other personal 
information, such as perfume, or salami or 
body odour, if the bag contained sneakers or 
dirty clothes. Undoubtedly, some odours reveal 
intimate details or information of a 
biographical nature. However…this fact alone 
does not make a search unreasonable: it is but 
one factor to be weighed and balanced with 
the other relevant factors. Here, a reasonable 
person would know that strong odours 
commonly escape from bags, and that 
passengers and baggage handlers will be in 
close enough proximity to the bags to detect 
these odours. Thus, even if a sniff can expose 
personal information, there could be no 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy 
in these circumstances. [references omitted, 
paras. 50-51] 
 
Since there was no privacy interest engaged, s.8 
was not triggered. 
 
The Arrest 
 
The police may arrest a person if they have 
reasonable grounds to believe the person is 
committing an indictable offence. This requires a 
subjective belief based on objective grounds. 
These objective grounds are not to be viewed in 
isolation but rather viewed as a whole. In 
assessing whether grounds exist a police 
officer’s training and experience is relevant in 
determining objective reasonableness. Even 
where objects may appear innocent to the 
general public they may have a different meaning 
to an experienced drug officer.  
 
Here, the officer testified that Bounce, 
although not a prohibited substance and used 
commonly by the general population, is also a 
common drug-camouflage agent. But it was not 
this fact alone that provided reasonable grounds 
for the arrest. Rather, it was combined with 
other factors. “An odour of fabric softener or 
other known camouflage agent will not always 
provide reasonable grounds for arrest, or even 
articulable cause to detain,” said the Court. 
“Similarly, the presence of a common household 
item will not always be dismissed as a neutral 
factor and ignored in the reasonable grounds 
calculus. Context and circumstances are key.” 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
ROBBERY VIOLENCE NEED  
NOT BE EXPLICIT 
R. v. Arsenault,  
(2006) Docket:C44608 (OntCA) 
 
The accused walked into a bank 
fully disguised. His head was 
wrapped with gauze bandages 
with only his eyes exposed and 
he was wearing a baseball cap. 
He handed the teller a note demanding money, 
refused to use his voice, and answered questions 
of the teller only by nodding or shaking his head. 
The teller was very nervous and wanted to make 
sure she did everything right so no one would be 
hurt. The accused received $5000 and left.  
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
accused conceded that a theft occurred, but 
argued it was not a robbery: there being no 
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threat of violence. The trial judge, however, 
concluded there were threats of violence.  
 
Subjectively, the accused acted with the 
specific intent of causing fear in the teller. He 
disguised himself, didn’t speak, and didn’t run 
when he got the money. Instead, he sat and 
waited until the teller complied with his intended 
purpose. Objectively, “the totality of [the 
accused’s] acts created the threat of violence to 
cause to effect his purpose of obtaining money 
from [the teller].” The accused was convicted of 
robbery under s.343(a) of the Criminal Code. 
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that he should have only 
been convicted of theft. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal, however, disagreed in a unanimous 
endorsement. The Court found “the threat of 
violence was implicit in the location of the crime 
and in the [accused’s] conduct, including his 
disguise.” The trial judge’s findings were 
supported by the evidence and the accused’s 
conviction appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
HYDRO EMPLOYEE NOT A 
STATE AGENT WHEN 
CHECKING ELECTRICAL 
CONSUMPTION 
R. v. Wallis, 2006 BCCA 481 
 
An employee contracted to BC 
Hydro to investigate hydro 
theft received a call from a 
police officer reporting an 
anonymous tip that there was a 
marihuana grow operation at the accused’s 
residence. There was a police policy in place to 
contact Hydro when a tip about a possible grow 
operation was received and the officer expected 
Hydro would investigate his tip. The Hydro 
employee (who was also an ex-police officer) 
checked the records and found that had the 
residence been set up as a grow op it was 
possible that there was an electrical bypass. He 
then attended the residence and did a “stick-
check” of the electricity meter using an 
ammeter. The electrical consumption recorded 
on the meter was compared to the amount of 
electricity actually being consumed in the 
residence. If the two measurements do not 
match then a theft is taking place. 
 
The employee then faxed the police officer 
stating there was a theft of electricity at the 
residence. The officer did not yet have 
sufficient grounds to obtain a search warrant 
for the suspected marihuana grow-operation, so 
obtained a general warrant for the theft of 
hydro which was granted. Police executed the 
search warrant and found an electrical bypass in 
the attic and a marihuana grow operation in the 
basement.   
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused argued that the Hydro employee was 
acting as an agent of the police. He submitted 
that the police had hydro do by the “back-door” 
what the police could not do through the “front 
door.” Thus, he contended that when the Hydro 
employee went onto the accused’s property to 
check the meter they were conducting a 
warrantless search thereby violating s.8 of the 
Charter. The information obtained by this action 
should therefore be expunged from supporting 
the search warrant and the resulting evidence 
obtained inadmissible under s.24(2).  
 
The trial judge, however, ruled that even though 
the officer had more than one motive in 
contacting hydro (theft of electricity/possible 
fire hazard and furthering his own marihuana 
grow investigation), his actions were lawful. The 
police gave no instructions or directions to the 
Hydro employee and he was not acting as an 
agent despite the fact the officer expected 
Hydro would investigate the tip. He was fulfilling 
his contractual right of access to the property 
under the BC Hydro and Power Authority 
Electric Tariff by checking on electricity usage. 
The accused’s application was dismissed and he 
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was convicted of unlawful production of 
marihuana. 
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in 
finding the Hydro employee was not acting as an 
agent of the police. Justice Prowse, authoring 
the unanimous opinion of the court, held that the 
question concerning whether the Hydro employee 
was acting as an agent is largely one of fact. In 
this case, the trial judge’s decision was 
supported by the evidence. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
TRAFFIC ARREST POWER 
REQUIRES COMPLIANCE WITH 
STATUTE 
R. v. Plummer, 
(2006) Docket:C41634 (OntCA) 
 
A police officer stopped the 
accused, a taxi driver, for not 
wearing his seatbelt. After twice 
requesting a driver’s licence, 
ownership papers and vehicle insurance without 
receiving them and warning of arrest for failing 
to identify, the accused was arrested under 
Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act (HTA). A scuffle 
ensued and the accused was subdued with the 
help of a citizen. He was charged with assaulting 
a peace officer in the execution of his duty and 
assault with intent to resist arrest.  
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
accused was convicted of resisting arrest while 
the assault police officer was stayed do to the 
Kienapple principle. The accused then 
unsuccessfully appealed to the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice arguing the elements of the 
arrestable offence under s.33 of the HTA had 
not been satisfied. The appeal judge rejected 
this claim, ruling the arrest lawful since the 
officer had demanded a licence twice and warned 
the accused he would be arrested for failing to 
identify. Furthermore, the appeal court held 
that even if the arrest was not lawful the 
accused should not have resisted arrest. Rather, 
he should have complied and sought a remedy in 
civil or criminal court or through the police 
complaints bureau. 
 
The accused then again appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal. In a 2:1 judgment the Ontario 
Court of Appeal found the arrest unlawful and 
acquitted the accused. Section 217(2) of the 
HTA provides limited powers of arrest for a 
police officer:  
 
s.217(2) Highway Traffic Act 
Any police officer who, on reasonable and probable 
grounds, believes that a contravention of any of the 
provisions of…subsection 33 (3)…has been committed, 
may arrest, without warrant, the person he or she believes 
committed the contravention 
 
Section 33 of the HTA imposes two duties on 
drivers. First, a driver must carry their licence 
with them while in charge of a motor vehicle. 
Second, a driver must surrender their licence 
for reasonable inspection upon the demand of a 
police officer:    
 
s.33 Highway Traffic Act 
(1)  Every driver of a motor vehicle or street car shall carry 
his or her licence with him or her at all times while he or 
she is in charge of a motor vehicle or street car and shall 
surrender the licence for reasonable inspection upon the 
demand of a police officer or officer appointed for carrying 
out the provisions of this Act. 
(2)  Every accompanying driver, as defined under section 
57.1, shall carry his or her licence and shall surrender the 
licence for reasonable inspection upon the demand of a 
police officer or officer appointed for carrying out the 
provisions of this Act.   
(3)  Every person who is unable or refuses to surrender his 
or her licence in accordance with subsection (1) or (2) 
shall, when requested by a police officer or officer 
appointed for carrying out the provisions of this Act, give 
reasonable identification of himself or herself and, for the 
purposes of this subsection, the correct name and 
address of the person shall be deemed to be reasonable 
identification.   
 
If the driver is unable or refuses to surrender 
their licence they may be required to provide 
some other form of reasonable identification, 
which includes giving one’s correct name and 
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address. Using the rules of statutory 
interpretation, Justice Rosenberg, authoring the 
majority judgement, interpreted this section to 
mean that “the obligation to provide alternative 
identification arises only when an officer makes 
a separate and specific demand for alternative 
identification.” In other words, the police 
officer must do something other than make a 
further demand for a driver’s licence under 
s.33(1) to trigger s.33(3). A separate request 
for alternative identification is needed to 
trigger the arrest power under s.217(2) for this 
offence. Justice Rosenberg concluded: 
 
In my view, the proper interpretation of s. 
33(3) requires that the officer must make a 
specific request for identification other than 
a driver’s licence.  Until that request for 
alternative identification has been made and 
the person has refused to comply, there is no 
contravention of the subsection.  It follows 
that there can be no power to arrest without a 
warrant until the officer has made the request 
for alternative identification. [para. 43] 
 
In this case, the officer only asked the accused 
to provide his licence. Although he did this 
repeatedly, he did not ask for some other 
reasonable identification. The s.33(1) duty was 
triggered, however the s.33(3) was not. Since 
the accused did not contravene s.33(3) of the 
HTA, the officer did not have reasonable and 
probable grounds to make the arrest. The 
arrest was therefore unlawful and the officer 
was not in the execution of his duty. Thus the 
offence of assaulting a peace officer in the 
execution of his duty was not made out. The 
accused’s appeal was allowed and the charges 
were dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Man cannot discover new oceans unless he has 
the courage to lose sight of the shore—Andre 
Gide 
REASONABLE GROUNDS 
REQUIRES OBJECTIVE BASIS 
Kirk v. Canada, 2006 ABCA 227 
 
A veteran Drug Control Section 
police officer received 
information that a male, 
travelling under a false name, 
went to Europe to acquire 
narcotics and would be transporting them back 
to Canada. The officer confirmed a passenger 
under the false name would be arriving at the 
airport on a flight from Hungary via Amsterdam. 
The plaintiff’s name appeared on the flight 
manifest as this male’s companion. Canada 
Customs were informed by police that the 
plaintiff and her male companion would be 
transporting drugs. The police had decided to 
arrest and search the plaintiff before her plane 
arrived.  
 
The two passengers were read their Charter 
rights by Customs Officers when they arrived at 
the airport and their luggage was searched. No 
illicit drugs were found in the plaintiff’s luggage. 
The plaintiff spoke to a lawyer and was strip 
searched, but no drugs were found. The plaintiff 
was arrested and taken to the hospital where 
stomach x-rays were performed. There was 
nothing to suggest ingestion of drugs but 
medications were ordered to induce vomiting. 
This was negative and enemas were ordered. 
This too was negative and a body cavity search 
was done. Like the other procedures nothing 
further was revealed and the plaintiff was 
released. 
 
The plaintiff sued both the police and medical 
staff for battery, unlawful search, and false 
imprisonment. The judge found the evidence of 
the officers unreliable. Investigation notes had 
been destroyed and the Police Service could not 
locate a report. The plaintiff was awarded 
$150,000 for general damages (to be shared by 
the officer in charge and the physician), 
$30,000 for unlawful search and false 
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imprisonment against the officer in charge, and 
$50,000 for exemplary and punitive damages 
against the officer in charge.  
 
The officer in charge of the Drug Control 
Section appealed the trial judge’s findings to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal, arguing, in part, that he 
erred when he found the police did not have 
reasonable and probable grounds to search the 
plaintiff, including the strip search. However, 
Justice Ritter, authoring the unanimous decision, 
upheld the trial judge’s findings. 
 
The informant never mentioned the plaintiff. 
She was only targeted by the police when she 
was identified in the flight manifest as the 
suspected drug transporter’s companion. Since 
the plaintiff was not identified by the informant, 
the only grounds remaining were the 
observations of the plaintiff made by airport 
Customs officers and items found in her checked 
luggage. The plaintiff was described by Customs 
officers as nervous, leaning on the counter, 
wearing dark sunglasses, and having a bloated 
appearance. In her luggage three cans of 
deodorant and a package of condoms were found. 
The plaintiff explained she had the condoms 
from a fear of contracting AIDS.  Justice Ritter 
stated: 
 
None of these supposed indicators that [the 
plaintiff] was carrying drugs provide 
reasonable and probable grounds. Moreover, 
reports from Customs officers disclose that 
[the police officers] made it clear they 
intended to arrest [the plaintiff and her 
companion] regardless of what was observed at 
the airport. The observations at the airport 
only became important to them when [the 
defendant] was sued. They had decided to 
arrest and search [the plaintiff] before she 
arrived in Edmonton.  
 
This leaves practically nothing to support the 
existence of reasonable and probable grounds. 
Although [the officer in charge] argues that 
the law relating to reasonable and probable 
grounds has developed since this event, and 
that he need only meet the standard that 
existed at the time, reasonable and probable 
grounds have never consisted of police feelings 
or hunches. Further, the law has been clear 
for years that the more intrusive the search, 
the more cogent must be the evidence to 
support the grounds. 
……… 
The test here involves both a subjective and 
an objective element… That is, the officers 
had to subjectively believe that they had the 
reasonable and probable grounds; and, looked 
at objectively, those grounds must exist. 
Although the trial judge misstated the test in 
concluding that “neither [police officer] could 
have objectively formed the opinion that they 
had reasonable and probable grounds to effect 
the searches and arrest of [the plaintiff]” …, 
it is nevertheless obvious that he concluded 
the objective element of the test was missing. 
 
Although it might be argued that this search 
was incidental to the arrest of [the plaintiff], 
the officers nevertheless required reasonable 
and probable grounds to arrest her in the first 
place. Again, the police are unable to establish, 
on an objective basis, that they had those 
grounds. Absent a legal arrest, a search 
incidental to arrest is also illegal. [references 
omitted, paras. 39-44] 
 
The officer in charge’s appeal from a finding of 
liability was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
  
THE ELEVEN COMPONENTS OF 
FITNESS! 
By Kelly Keith 
 
Suspect: Male, 6’2”, 250 lbs, large build 
Police Officer: Female, 5’7”, 120lbs, slender build 
 
If the suspect attacks the police officer, what 
factors determine who wins this altercation? 
 
• Spontaneous Attack 
• Weapon Readiness 
• Winning Mindset 
• Number of Officers 
• Tactics 
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• Fitness 
• Strength 
• Fighting Ability - Control Tactics 
 
How can we best train police officers in fitness 
and strength, which will ultimately enhance 
fighting ability/control tactics?   
 
If the above-mentioned police officer trained 
with weights everyday is it possible that she 
would be able to match the strength of the 
suspect?  
 
As police trainers with a limited amount of time, 
are we getting the best return for our time by 
getting our recruits/officers into the gym on 
weights and/or running?  
 
Does this type of fitness training turn out the 
officers that are going to defend themselves 
better and will there be fitter officers at the 
end of training?   
 
Training with weights and running are absolutely 
great ways to build foundations, but as police 
trainers we need to enhance the other fitness 
components, which will enable the officer to win!   
 
A simple example is rotary power.   Rotary power 
will address how hard you can swing your baton, 
punch, kick and/or throw a suspect to the ground.  
Rotary power is also needed in most escapes from 
the ground.  Officers can increase rotary power 
just as easily as building bigger biceps! 
 
There will always be strength differences.  It is 
obviously not possible to always be stronger or in 
better shape than all of our suspects, however by 
understanding our strengths and addressing our 
weaknesses police trainers need to enhance the 
eleven components of fitness for each officer not 
just aerobic power and strength.     
 
The Eleven Components  
 
Many fitness factors have to be considered to 
optimize a police officers fitness and ability to 
defend themselves. 
 
 
Muscular Power / Speed Strength 
  
This is the ability to produce force in a brief 
amount of time. In other words the product of 
force and velocity.  Should a police officer 
possess strength, but cannot apply this strength 
rapidly, the amount of strength they have is 
irrelevant if it cannot be applied in time. 
 
Thus to develop Power you must apply speed to 
the desired movement or specific tactical 
situation. 
 
This is an imperative factor for a police officer, 
as the ability to produce force in a brief amount 
of time is vital in any physical confrontation.  
There are many very strong police officers that 
are not able to transition this strength into 
“speed strength” which is more beneficial to 
police officers.  
   
Muscular Strength 
 
This is considered the ability to produce maximal 
force.  Strength is vital to optimize muscular 
power but is different in the Speed that the 
force is exerted.  Research indicates that most 
people can perform about 10 repetitions with 75 
% of their one rep maximum.  Thus if someone can 
bench press 100 pounds for one repetition they 
are most likely able to perform about 10 
repetitions with 75 pounds. 
 
Fast twitch muscles – generally low endurance – 
higher power but less endurance thus less than 10 
repetitions with 75 % of one rep maximum. 
 
Slow twitch muscles – generally high endurance 
can perform more than 10 repetitions with 75 % 
of one rep maximum.             
 
Research shows that previously untrained men and 
women gain about two to four pounds of muscle 
and 40 to 60 % more strength after two months 
of regular strength training – it then slows down 
but typically continues for several months. 
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Gender: Men typically have more muscle than 
women – muscle is positively influenced by the 
presence of testosterone (male sex hormone).  
 
Generally larger muscles are stronger muscles 
(one to two kilograms of force per square 
centimeter of cross sectional area).    Simply 
speaking, men generally have more muscle than 
women and thus generally men are stronger than 
women. 
 
Muscular Endurance 
 
This is the ability to perform repeated muscular 
actions, which can be very important in any 
physical confrontation that lasts longer than 
approximately 15 seconds.  In any altercation the 
addition of Muscular Endurance will lengthen the 
time period you can physically perform optimally 
under stressful metabolic conditions.    
 
Muscular endurance is an important aspect of a 
police officers training program.  The principle of 
specificity applies, which means that muscular 
endurance is activity specific. A marathon runner, 
although having muscular endurance in their legs 
would not mean that they can skate the same 
distance.  By simply running, police officers should 
not believe they could grapple on the ground 
longer than a subject that trains for this 
stimulus.   
 
Flexibility 
 
This is the ability to move the joints through a 
range of motion.  In weight training it is vital to 
exercise both sides of a joint so as to not limit 
joint flexibility. Benefits of Flexibility include: 
 
• Less energy to move a joint through a range of 
motion 
• Decreased risk of injury 
• Increased blood supply and nutrients to joint 
structures 
• Increased neuromuscular coordination / 
opposing muscle groups work in a more 
synergistic or coordinated fashion. 
• Improved muscular balance and postural 
awareness 
• Decreased risk of lower back pain 
• Reduced stress – stretching promotes muscle 
relaxation.   
 
Balance 
 
This is the ability to maintain the center of body 
mass over a base of support.  This is another very 
important factor for a police officer as the 
officer’s ability to be stable when the body is in 
motion is a crucial element in a physical 
confrontation. 
 
Body Composition 
 
Age, height, gender, body type, body mass, muscle 
fiber type etc. This can greatly affect a police 
officer. However, there are many of these 
components an officer cannot do anything about 
(age, gender, etc).  Each officer brings their 
genetic inheritance into the mix. However, how 
they train, how they use available strategies, and 
how they integrate these strategies in 
performance dictates the degree of success.  
 
Cardiorespiratory Fitness/Aerobic Endurance 
 
This is the ability to persist or sustain activity 
for a prolonged period of time.  For best results 
strive for 50 to 85 % of maximal oxygen uptake 
to get optimal cardiorespiratory results.  Duration 
will vary depending on intensity. Generally, police 
officers with greater Cardiorespiratory Fitness 
have more stamina, less fatigue, and fewer risks 
of injuries. 
 
Agility 
 
Agility is sometimes thought of as the culmination 
of nearly all the physical abilities that a person 
possesses.  It is the ability to stop and change 
direction quickly.  There are few, if any, 
confrontational situations that require speed in 
only a straight-line movement. Agility is composed 
of: 
 
• Coordination 
• Stabilization 
• Biomechanics 
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• Speed 
• Strength (stabilizing / propulsive) 
• Energy system development 
• Elasticity 
• Power 
• Dynamic Balance 
• Mobility 
 
There are studies that show a tennis player has 
greater agility when they have a tennis racquet in 
their hand then when they do not. Thus, training 
agility is optimized when the implement you wish 
agility to be utilized is used when training  (eg. 
baton, sidearm, empty-handed etc. 
 
Agility is often overlooked as an aspect of fitness 
but is an extremely important one for a police 
officer.  One of the most important qualities of 
control tactics is for the officer to get off the 
line of attack.  Most police attacks are 
spontaneous. Whether a fist, knife, or bullet, an 
officer able to get off the line of attack is far 
more likely to win the confrontation.    
 
Quickness / Reaction time 
 
This is reaction time and movement time in 
response to a specific stimulus.  This fitness 
aspect is very important to policing as well.  How 
fast can the officer get to their equipment when 
the stimulus is presented to the officer – draw 
sidearm, baton, etc.  If this aspect is enhanced 
the police officer can enhance their chances of 
success in a confrontation. 
 
Quickness allows a small officer to prosper in a 
big “man’s” game and gives a large officer another 
way to improve their tactics.  
 
Speed 
 
This is basically how fast a person can move from 
point “A” to point “B” forward, backward or 
laterally.  Pure speed can give a police officer an 
advantage in getting to cover, tactically re-
positioning, getting to the aid of a victim, or 
catching a suspect in a short foot chase.  
 
Coordination 
 
Coordination can reflect how well joints manage 
the muscular firing patterns between or among 
them.  It is crucial in the hand-eye relationship 
needed in policing.   
 
Coordination is prominent in transition exercises – 
eg. baton to sidearm.  It is also important in 
shooting, and many other firearm activities. 
 
In future articles I will break down each fitness 
component and show you ways to improve each! 
 
(reference: Bill Foran; High Performance Sports 
Conditioning) 
 
TRAVELLER NOT DETAINED 
DURING ROUTINE SEARCH AT 
BORDER  
U.S. v. Reda, 2006 QCCA 1254 
 
The applicant, a Canadian 
citizen, was subject to a routine 
search of his vehicle by Canada 
Customs while entering from 
the United States. His vehicle 
had been entered as a lookout on the customs 
computer indicating “proceed of crime” and he 
was referred to secondary. In his vehicle 
customs officers found a telephone bill and a 
small amount of amphetamines. He was asked to 
remove his jacket and it felt unusually heavy. He 
was escorted to a detention room where his 
jacket was searched and a sum of $151,137.25 
USD was found in 16 pockets of his jacket. He 
was arrested for drug smuggling and cautioned, 
read the secondary warning, and his rights to 
legal counsel were explained. He was then frisk 
searched and subjected to a strip search.  
 
It was learned that he did not declare this 
money to US Customs before leaving the US. A 
copy of the telephone bill was transmitted to the 
US Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (BICE). As a result of a BICE 
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investigation, the US was seeking to extradite 
the accused on drug and possession charges.  
 
The accused sought various forms of Charter 
relief in Quebec Superior Court including the 
exclusion of evidence from the extradition 
proceeding gathered by Canada Customs, an 
order forbidding Canadian authorities from 
providing the evidence to the US, and an order 
staying the proceedings. He argued, in part, that 
the search of his person and vehicle violated s.8 
of the Charter and that his rights under s.10(b) 
were breached.  
 
The extradition judge found the applicants 
Charter rights were not breached. Under s.98 of 
the Customs Act a customs officer only need  
suspect on reasonable grounds that a person has 
prohibited material secreted on or about their 
person to conduct a search. The same standard 
applies to vehicle searches under s.99. In this 
case, the officer had reasonable grounds to 
suspect the applicant’s car may be importing a 
large amount of currency. She then found the 
telephone bill in the van and the money in his 
jacket. The search of the car and request for 
the jacket was a routine search of baggage and a 
pat or frisk of outer clothing as described by the 
Supreme Court of Canada as falling in the first 
category of border searches. The applicant was 
therefore not detained in the constitutional sense 
at this point. The telephone bill and the finding of 
the money was admissible as proof for the 
extradition hearing.  
 
The applicant then appealed the judgment to the 
Quebec Court of Appeal. In a unanimous opinion, 
the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the 
applicant surrender to the authorities within 48 
hours. The Court stated: 
 
The fact that there was a “look out” in the 
customs system when the appellant approached 
the Canadian border that was acted on by the 
customs authorities does not mean, in the 
circumstances revealed by the testimony of 
the three customs officers, that the appellant 
was detained when the elements of proof that 
he sought to have excluded by the extradition 
judge were uncovered. Unlike the facts 
described in Jacoy, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 548, they 
were not exercising their authority as customs 
officers in the pursuit of an active police 
investigation. [para. 2] 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
INJURIES TOO REMOTE TO 
HOLD POLICE LIABLE  
Rhora v. Ontario, 
(2006) Docket:C42091 (OntCA) 
 
The plaintiff was diagnosed 
with bipolar disorder and placed 
on a lithium regime. He had 
stopped taking his medication 
and one day, while intoxicated, hit his head and 
fell unconscious. He went to the hospital for 
treatment and was released. Five days later he 
called the police and asked them to come and 
arrest him for growing marijuana. He said he was 
afraid that some people would take his plants 
and hurt or kill him. When the police arrived, 
they found him armed with a knife and a pellet 
gun and with broken glass in his pockets; his 
room had been trashed and he reported that he 
had been taking heroin. The police charged him 
with possession of weapons and took him into 
custody. They noted that he was acting 
strangely, but that he was calm. Although they 
considered using s. 11 of Ontario’s Mental Health 
Act to take him to a hospital, they decided that 
by arresting him any danger to him or others 
would be addressed. 
 
The plaintiff was kept overnight at the police 
station and then transferred to a detention 
centre. While in custody, the police learned from 
the plaintiff’s ex-wife that he suffered from a 
chemical imbalance and had been prescribed 
lithium. The police, however, did not pass this 
information on to the detention centre. The 
detention centre did learn from the plaintiff’s 
relatives that he had a six-year psychiatric 
history where he exhibited strange behaviour. 
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He also acted aggressively during a visit from his 
brothers. He was subsequently placed in the 
psychiatric unit in a cell with two other men. He 
later fought with the two other men, killing one 
of them.  
 
He was taken to the hospital for his injuries and 
saw a staff psychiatrist at the detention centre 
the next day. No medication was prescribed and 
he subsequently injured himself in his cell by 
banging his head against the wall. He was tried 
for murdering his cell-mate but was found not 
guilty by reason of mental disorder. He was held 
on a warrant of committal and released into the 
community eight years later on medication.  
 
The plaintiff and his family sued the police, 
among others, for failing to immediately apply 
s.11 of the Mental Health Act and send him for a 
psychiatric assessment. This negligence, it was 
suggested, resulted in the plaintiff killing his 
cell-mate, receiving an eight-year committal, and 
suffering significant head injury.  
 
Section 11 of the Mental Health Act reads:  
 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
the trial judge dismissed the action. The trial 
judge found that neither the police nor the 
detention centre fell below the standard of care 
required of them and even if they did, the 
damages the plaintiff suffered were not 
foreseeable and were too remote. Nor was there 
any systemic negligence. Further, the head 
injury probably resulted from his earlier fall at 
home when he struck his head. He also held that 
the police may take into account neighbourhood 
factor’s and its residents when deciding what is 
“normal” under s.11 and that the police need not 
revisit a decision not to seek an assessment.  
 
The plaintiff appealed the findings of the trial 
court denying liability to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal. Writing the opinion of the court, Justice 
Feldman dismissed the appeal. The police did not 
breach their duty of care. And even if the 
defendants did not meet the standard of care 
required of them, the action or inaction of the 
defendants did not cause the damages. The 
failure of the police to communicate information 
about the plaintiff’s mental illness to the 
detention centre was not a proximate cause of 
the killing or of any further injury to the 
plaintiff and any damages he suffered were too 
remote.  
 
Justice Feldman, however, did note that the trial 
judge erred in his interpretation of what is 
“normal” under s.11 of the Mental Health Act by 
allowing the police to consider factors relating 
to the nature of the plaintiff’s neighbourhood 
and its residents (someone living in one of the 
city’s toughest neighbourhoods and involved with 
drugs). He stated: 
 
This type of analysis could well result in a 
hands-off approach by the police to people 
who may be in dire need of psychiatric help. 
This would further disadvantage those who are 
already living on the fringes of society. On the 
other hand, the police were entitled to 
consider the fact that the appellant told them 
he had been taking heroin when they assessed 
whether his behaviour was “disorderly” as 
compared to a “normal” person, in the context 
of s. 11. [para. 18] 
 
s. 11 Mental Health Act 
Where a constable or other peace officer observes a person 
who acts in a manner that in a normal person would be 
disorderly and has reasonable cause to believe that the 
person 
(a) has threatened or attempted or is threatening or 
attempting to cause bodily harm to himself; 
(b) has behaved or is behaving violently towards another 
person or has caused or is causing another person to fear 
bodily harm from him; or 
(c) has shown or is showing a lack of competence to care for 
himself, 
and in addition the constable or other peace officer is of the 
opinion that the person is apparently suffering from mental 
disorder of a nature or quality that likely will result in, 
(d) serious bodily harm to the person; 
(e) serious bodily harm to another person; or 
(f) imminent and serious physical impairment of the person, 
and that it would be dangerous to proceed under s. 10 
[bringing information on oath before a justice of the peace for 
an order for assessment by a physician], the constable or 
other peace officer may take the person in custody to an 
appropriate place for assessment by a physician. 
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Despite this error, the officers involved did 
consider him acting very strangely. However, 
they determined he did not meet the other 
criteria under s.11 and decided not to seek an 
assessment. The plaintiff’s admission he took 
heroin would affect his judgment and 
perceptions. He was calm and compliant. The 
police did not err in their decision.  
 
The trial judge also erred in holding that the 
police need not revisit a decision not to seek an 
assessment under s.11 if they learn new relevant 
information. If the police decide not to seek an 
assessment but new relevant information is 
learned, they should revisit their decision under 
s.11. But once again, the police saw no signs of 
violence in the plaintiff’s behaviour and were not 
negligent in not referring the plaintiff for 
assessment after learning of his mental illness.   
 
Training 
 
Justice Feldman commented on the desirability 
of specialized training for police officers to 
assist them in dealing as effectively as possible 
with mentally ill prisoners. Although he noted 
that police officers are not psychiatric 
professionals, “it is apparent from many aspects 
of this case, including the initial arrest of the 
[plaintiff], that it would be helpful for the police 
to have more training in evaluating abnormal 
behaviour, so that they are able to make the 
best judgment possible to apply the criteria of 
the Act in the interests of the individual and of 
society.”  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
DELAYED POLICE ARRIVAL 
EXPLAINED BY BUSY NIGHT 
R. v. Carey,  
(2006) Docket:C43623 (OntCA) 
 
A witness telephoned 911 in the 
early morning hours to report a 
motor vehicle accident when a 
car left the roadway and struck 
a light standard. The caller did not indicate that 
alcohol might be involved. About an hour later an 
officer, who saw the call was still outstanding, 
arrived on scene and arrested the accused for 
impaired driving. He was taken to the police 
station where two samples of his breath were 
taken, both over the legal limit. The first sample 
was taken one hour an forty minutes after the 
accident. 
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
accused argued that the Crown had failed to 
prove the breath samples were taken as soon as 
practicable after the accident as required by 
the Criminal Code. The trial judge, however, 
found the delay could be explained because the 
police did not arrive and start their investigation 
until some one hour and ten minutes after the 
accident. The accused was convicted of over 
80mg% and the impaired charge was stayed. 
 
The accused successfully appealed to the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The appeal 
judge held the trial judge erred in considering 
only the delay from police arrival until the tests 
were taken. In his view, the Crown failed to 
reasonably explain the delay in attending the 
accident. It wasn’t enough for the officer to say 
they were busy that night. The Crown failed to 
prove the breath samples were taken as soon as 
practicable, the accused’s appeal was allowed, 
and his conviction quashed. 
 
A further appeal by the Crown to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal was successful. Justice 
Juriansz, writing the judgment of the Court, 
agreed that the trial judge applied the wrong 
legal standard when he considered only the time 
between the officer’s arrival and the taking of 
the breath samples. However, this was not a case 
where a delay occurred after the driver had 
been detained and the breath demand had 
already been made. Rather, the delay that 
required explanation in this case occurred 
before the grounds for the demand developed. 
Justice Juriansz stated: 
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In my view, the arresting officer’s testimony 
that it was a busy night and that other calls 
were waiting coupled with the fact that there 
had been no suggestion in the initial call that 
alcohol might have been involved in the 
accident was capable of supporting a finding 
that the delayed police arrival was reasonable 
in the circumstances.  It was unnecessary for 
the Crown to call a senior officer from the 
detachment or the dispatcher on duty to 
explain how the police were deployed to the 
various patrol areas or to provide details about 
what other calls occupied the police that 
night.  In my respectful view, the other 
possible inferences suggested by the appeal 
judge, for example that there might have been 
fourteen murders in town that night, were 
speculative. [para. 16] 
 
A new trial was ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
HAIRCUT DISCRIMINATION 
COMPLAINT DISMISSED  
Mosher v. West Vancouver Police 
Department & others,  
2006 BCHRT 86 
 
A police officer filed a 
complaint with the BC Human 
Rights Tribunal alleging that his 
department, police chief, and 
inspector discriminated against 
him on the basis of sex, contrary to s.13 of the 
Human Rights Code, because there were 
different grooming standards for male and 
female hair length. In his view, these different 
standards were discriminatory and the same 
standard should apply to both genders.  
 
After reviewing the purposes of the Human 
Rights Code, Tribunal Member Barbara 
Humphreys dismissed the officer’s complaint. 
She stated: 
 
In my view, a different hair grooming standard 
for female and male officers does not 
constitute an impediment to [the officer’s] 
ability to participate fully in the economic, 
social, political or cultural life of British 
Columbia nor does it impact on his dignity. 
Given the substance and context of this 
complaint, and its de minimus nature, it would 
not, in my opinion, further the purposes of the 
Code to proceed with the complaint …[para. 10] 
 
Complete case available at www.bchrt.bc.ca 
 
‘IN SERVICE’ LEGAL ROAD 
TEST ANSWERS 
 
1. (a) True —see R. v. Le & Nguyen, R. v. Tran (at 
p. 7 of this publication). 
 
2. (a) True—see R. v. Rajaratnam (at p. 8 of this 
publication).  
 
3. (b) False—see R. v. Wallis (at p. 11 of this 
publication).  
 
4. (b) False—see R. v. Powers (at p. 24 of this 
publication).  
 
WITNESS TO POLICE 
MISCONDUCT NOT A PERSON 
‘DIRECTLY AFFECTED’ 
Canadian Civil Liberties and Rolfe v. 
Ontario Civilian Commission on Police 
Services,  
(2006) Docket:C45104 (OntCA) 
 
A witness (Rolfe) believed he 
saw police misconduct. He said 
he saw a police officer escorting 
a handcuffed woman from a 
store and suddenly slam her to 
the ground, causing her to strike her head on the 
pavement. He was “stunned” by the officer’s 
actions and found the incident to be very 
disturbing, causing him anxiety and loss of sleep. 
One year later Rolfe filed a formal complaint 
under Ontario’s Police Services Act relating to 
the officer’s conduct. The Police Chief advised 
Rolfe his complaint would not be treated as a 
 Volume 6 Issue 6             www.10-8.ca 
November/December 2006 
23 
formal complaint because he had not been 
“directly affected” by the alleged conduct, as 
required by s.59 of the Act. The police would not 
disclose any information to Rolfe about an 
internal investigation that resulted from his 
allegations nor its conclusions. Rolfe asked the 
Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services to 
review the Police Chief’s decision, but they 
agreed with it.  
 
A judicial review was then undertaken in 
Divisional Court of the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice to determine whether Rolfe was a person 
“directly affected” by the police conduct. 
Section 57(1) of the Police Services Act states 
that “a complaint may be made by a member of 
the public only if the complainant was directly 
affected by the…conduct that is the subject of 
the complaint,” while s.59(5) states that “the 
chief of police shall not deal with any complaint 
made by a member of the public if he or she 
decides that the complainant was not directly 
affected by the…conduct that is the subject of 
the complaint.”  
 
Justice Molloy, with Justice Lane concurring, 
concluded that a person “directly affected” is 
someone more than merely “affected” and 
requires “some direct link between the person 
filing the complaint and the police conduct which 
is the subject of the complaint, something that 
distinguishes the complainant’s interest from 
that of any other member of the community.” 
Requiring a person to be injured by the police 
was far too restrictive of an interpretation of 
“directly affected” while allowing anyone unhappy 
with the police to complain would be too broad.  
In holding Rolfe a person “directly affected”, 
Justice Molloy wrote: 
 
He was actually present at the time of the 
alleged assault.  He witnessed at close range 
the assault and its aftermath.  He spoke to 
the police officer.  He was disturbed by what 
he saw and shaken by it even after the event. 
In other words, he was directly affected by 
what he witnessed, even though he was not 
physically struck by the police.  His position 
goes beyond that of a concerned citizen as 
part of the general community; his experience 
was firsthand. 
 
Associate Chief Justice Cunningham disagreed 
with the majority. In his view Rolfe was not a 
person “directly affected” but merely a witness. 
He stated:  
 
It would be unreasonable to conclude that the 
Legislature intended each and every witness to 
alleged misconduct could interject themselves 
into the process of resolving public complaints, 
including becoming a party to any hearing and 
having rights of appeal from any decision 
taken.  Moreover, no useful purpose would be 
served by having this matter designated as a 
public complaint since the matter has been 
fully investigated and dealt with by the Chief 
of Police.  Treating this as a public complaint 
would allow Rolfe to obtain personal 
information concerning the alleged victim and 
to make decisions about the processing of the 
complaint.  Indeed, I see no utility in having 
Rolfe’s complaint designated as a public 
complaint.  In fact mischievous results could 
arise from doing so. [para. 4] 
 
And further: 
 
There can be little doubt that Rolfe was 
“affected” by the impugned conduct.  However, 
that is not enough.  He has no personal 
interest in the matter.  If the Legislature 
intended to include anyone “affected” by police 
conduct, it would not have included the word 
“directly” in the legislation.  By including the 
word “directly”, the Legislature clearly sought 
to carefully circumscribe the right of 
complaint.  By including the word “directly” as 
an adverb, the Legislature must have intended 
there to be a degree of proximity before a 
person “affected” would be able to lodge a 
complaint. [para. 15] 
 
The majority allowed the application for judicial 
review, set aside the Commission’s decision, and 
Rolfe’s complaint was sent back to the Police 
Chief to be treated as a formal complaint as a 
person “directly affected” by the alleged police 
conduct.  
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The Commission then appealed the Divisional 
Court’s decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
In a unanimous endorsement, the appeal court 
found the majority’s interpretation of “directly 
affected” wrong. “Directly affected” requires 
the person have a personal and individual 
interest rather than just a general interest that 
pertains to the whole community. In this case, 
Rolfe could not provide the necessary link that 
he was “directly affected.” The appeal was 
allowed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
STATUTORILY COMPELLED 
STATEMENT AT ACCIDENT 
SCENE INADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Powers, 2006 BCCA 454 
 
The accused clipped the back 
of another vehicle on a highway 
and ended up in the ditch.  A 
police officer arrived on scene 
and both the accused and the other driver were 
present. The officer asked, “Who is the driver 
of the car in the ditch.” The accused said he 
was. The officer noted the accused had red eyes 
and his breath smelled of alcohol. The approved 
screening device demand was given and he failed. 
A breathalyzer demand was made and the 
accused subsequently provided samples of his 
breath in excess of 80mg%.  
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
judge ruled that the accused’s admission he was 
driving was inadmissible under s.24(1) of the 
Charter. He thought he was required to answer 
the officer’s question and report the accident to 
police. Without the admission, the officer did 
not have the reasonable suspicion required that 
there was alcohol in the body of a person 
operating a vehicle. The fail reading on the 
approved screening device, therefore, could not 
be used to support grounds for the breath 
demand. Accordingly the officer did not have 
reasonable grounds to make the demand in terms 
of identifying the accused as the driver of the 
vehicle in the ditch. He was acquitted of driving 
over 80mg%. A Crown appeal to the British 
Columbia Supreme Court was unsuccessful. The 
Crown further appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of appeal.  
 
Justice Saunders, authoring the unanimous 
opinion of the appeal court, dismissed the appeal. 
Section 7 of the Charter guarantees that 
everyone has the right not to be deprived of 
life, liberty and security of the person except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice, which includes the principle against self-
incrimination induced by statutorily compelled 
information. Section 67 of British Columbia’s 
Motor Vehicle Act requires the driver of a 
motor vehicle involved in an accident to report 
the accident to police and provide information 
about the accident as required by the police. 
 
Although the question posed by the officer was 
no more than a preliminary exchange expected in 
a situation like this and was no more than what 
might be asked by an interested bystander, the 
officer was starting to mentally complete the 
accident investigation report and the accused 
felt obligated to answer. The statement made by 
the accused was self-incriminatory and its 
admission into the trial would contravene s.7 of 
the Charter.  
 
Nor was the statement admissible for the 
limited purpose of establishing reasonable 
grounds for making a breath demand under s.254 
of the Criminal Code.  The trial judge did not err 
in ruling the statement admissible under s.24(1) 
of the Charter. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
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